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A Game-theoretic Perspective on Communication
for Omniscience
Ni Ding∗, Chung Chan†, Tie Liu‡, Rodney A. Kennedy∗, Parastoo Sadeghi∗
Abstract—We propose a coalition game model for the problem
of communication for omniscience (CO). In this game model,
the core contains all achievable rate vectors for CO with sum-
rate being equal to a given value. Any rate vector in the core
distributes the sum-rate among users in a way that makes all
users willing to cooperate in CO. We give the necessary and
sufficient condition for the core to be nonempty. Based on this
condition, we derive the expression of the minimum sum-rate for
CO and show that this expression is consistent with the results in
multivariate mutual information (MMI) and coded cooperative
data exchange (CCDE). We prove that the coalition game model
is convex if the sum-rate is no less than the minimal value. In
this case, the core is non-empty and a rate vector in the core that
allocates the sum-rate among the users in a fair manner can be
found by calculating the Shapley value.
I. INTRODUCTION
Communication for omniscience (CO) is a problem pro-
posed in [1]. It is assumed that there is a group of users
in the system and each of them observes a component of a
discrete memoryless multiple source in private. The users can
exchange their information in certain way, e.g., communicating
over lossless broadcast channels, so as to attain omniscience,
the state that each user obtains the total information in the
entire multiple source in the system. The CO problem in [1] is
based on an asymptotic source model. The coded cooperative
data exchange (CCDE) problem proposed in [2] is a special
case of the CO problem where the source model is a non-
asymptotic finite linear packet one. The non-asymptotic model
differs from the asymptotic one in that the communication
rates only take integer values. By allowing packet splitting,
the CCDE problem has been extended for asymptotic model
in [3], [4]. Independently, the same model has been considered
in the closely related secret key agreement (SKA) problem by
[5], and is called the finite linear source model.
Determining the minimum sum-rate and finding an optimal
rate vector that allocates the minimum sum-rate such that om-
niscience is achievable are two fundamental problems in CO.
The expressions of the minimum sum-rate for asymptotic and
non-asymptotic models are derived in [6] based on multivariate
mutual information (MMI) for SKA [7] and in [4] for CCDE.
It is also shown that an optimal rate vector can be solved
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via submodular function minimization (SFM) algorithms in
strongly polynomial time, e.g., the algorithms in [3], [8] based
on Edmond’s greedy algorithm [9]. However, these works only
focus on finding a solution for CO while neglecting the users’
motivation to cooperate. For example, the algorithms in [3],
[8] usually output an unfair rate vector which may discourage
some users from taking part in CO.
In this paper, we view the CO problem from a coalitional
game theoretic perspective. In this game model, each user is
assumed to be self-determined in that they can decide whether
or not to cooperate and join a certain coalition, a subset of
the users. The core of the game is the set of achievable rate
vectors with sum-rate being equal to a given value in CO
and any rate vector in the core distributes the sum-rate among
users in a way that makes all users willing to cooperate in
the grand coalition, the entire user set. By using the concepts
and related results of submodularity and its base polyhedron
[10], we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the
core to be nonempty. We give the expressions of the minimum
sum-rate for asymptotic and non-asymptotic models and show
that they are in agreement with the results in [4], [6]. The
coalitional game model also addresses another problem in CO:
how to allocate the rate fairly to motivate the users to cooperate
in asymptotic model. We show that the game is equivalent
to a convex game and a fair rate allocation method can be
determined by Shapley value if the sum-rate is no less than
the minimum value. As compared to the existing method that
addresses the fairness in CCDE in [11], the main advantage
of Shapley value is that it can be calculated in a decentralized
manner, i.e., it is possible for each user to obtain his/her tuple
in Shapley value by him/herself.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Let V be a finte set. We assume that there are |V | > 1
users in the system. A random variable will be denoted by
the san serif font as in Z, and its alphabet by the usual math
font as in Z . ZV = (Zi : i ∈ V ) is a vector of discrete
random variables indexed by V . For each i ∈ V , user i can
privately observe an n-sequence Zni of the random source Zi
that is i.i.d. generated according to the joint distribution PZV .
We allow users exchange their sources directly so as to let
all users i ∈ V recover the source sequence ZnV . We consider
both asymptotic and non-asymptotic models. In the asymptotic
model, we will characterize the asymptotic behavior as the
block length n goes to infinity. In non-asymptotic model, the
communication rates are required to be integer valued.
Let rV = (ri : i ∈ V ) be a rate vector indexed by V . We
call rV an achievable rate vector if omniscience is possible by
2letting users communicate with the rates designated by rV . Let
r(V ) =
∑
i∈V ri. For X,Y ⊆ V , let H(ZX) be the amount
of randomness in ZX measured by Shannon entropy [12] and
H(ZX |ZY ) = H(ZX∪Y )−H(ZY ) be the conditional entropy
of ZX given ZY . It is shown in [1] that an achievable rate
must satisfy the Slepian-Wolf constraints:
r(X) ≥ H(ZX |ZV \X), ∀X ⊂ V. (1)
The interpretation of the Slepian-Wolf constraint on X is: To
achieve CO, the total amount of information sent from user
set X should be at least complementary to total amount of
information that is missing in user set V \X . The set of all
achievable rate vectors is
RCO(ZV ) = {rV ∈ R
|V |
+ : r(X) ≥ H(ZX |ZV \X), ∀X ⊂ V }
and the minimum sum-rate can be determined by the following
linear programming (LP)
RCO(ZV ) = min{r(V ) : rV ∈ RCO(ZV )}.
We denote the set of optimal rates as
R
∗
CO(ZV ) = {rV ∈ RCO(ZV ) : r(V ) = RCO(ZV )}. (2)
For non-asymptotic model, the achievable rate set is
RCO(ZV ) ∩ Z|V |, RCO(ZV ) ∈ N0 and the optimal rate set
is R∗CO(ZV ) ∩ Z|V |.
In CCDE, it is assumed that user i obtains a packet set
W{i} that contains finite number of packets each of which
belongs to a field Fq. The users transmit linear combinations
of their packet set via lossless wireless channels so as to
help the others to recover all packets in WV = ∪i∈VW{i}.
In this problem, the value of entropy function H(ZX) can
be obtained by counting the number of packets in WX , i.e.,
H(ZX) = |WX | and H(ZX |ZY ) = |WX∪Y | − |WY |, and all
results derived in this paper hold.
Example II.1. Consider the set V = {1, 2, 3} where 3 users
observe respectively
Z1 = (Wa,Wb,Wc,Wd,We),
Z2 = (Wa,Wb,Wf ),
Z3 = (Wc,Wd,Wf ).
Wi’s are independent uniformly distributed random bits. The
users exchange their private observations to achieve the global
omniscience of ZV = (Wa, . . . ,Wf ). In this system, the
achievable rate set is
RCO(ZV ) = {rV ∈ R
|V |
+ : r(∅) = 0,
r({1}) ≥ H(Z1|Z{2,3}) = 1,
r({2}) ≥ H(Z2|Z{1,3}) = 0,
r({3}) ≥ H(Z3|Z{1,2}) = 0,
r({1, 2}) ≥ H(Z{1,2}|Z3) = 3,
r({1, 3}) ≥ H(Z{1,3}|Z2) = 3,
r({2, 3}) ≥ H(Z{2,3}|Z1) = 1}.
It can be shown that RCO(ZV ) = 3.5 and R∗CO(ZV ) =
{(2.5, 0.5, 0.5)} for the asymptotic model and RCO(ZV ) = 4
and R∗CO(ZV ) ∩ Z|V | = {(3, 0, 1), (2, 1, 1), (3, 1, 0)} for the
non-asymptotic model.
III. COALITIONAL GAME
We model the system as a coalitional game G(V, α, fα). In
this game, it is assumed that the users can choose to cooperate
and form coalitions. A coalition is a group/set of clients that
is denoted by X ⊆ V and V is called the grand coalition.
Let α ∈ R+. We define the characteristic function for a given
value of α as
fα(X) =
{
H(ZX |ZV \X) X ⊂ V
α X = V
.
We call fα(X) the value of coalition X which quantifies the
payoff of forming coalition X .
A. Core
The core of G(V, α, fα) is
CG = {rV ∈ R
|V |
+ : r(X) ≥ fα(X), ∀X ⊆ V,
r(V ) = fα(V )} (3)
for asymptotic model and CG∩Z|V | for non-asymptotic model.
Let the polyhedron of the characteristic function fα be
P (fα,≥) = {rV ∈ R
|V |
+ : r(X) ≥ H(ZX |ZV \X), ∀X ⊆ V }.
The core CG is exactly the base polyhedron of fα:
B(fα,≥) = {rV ∈ R
|V |
+ : rV ∈ P (fα,≥) : r(V ) = fα(V )}.
Consider the constraints in B(fα,≥). Let
f#α (X) = fα(V )− fα(V \X) = α− fα(V \X), ∀X ⊆ V
be the dual set function of fα. If we restrict the rate vector rV
to satisfy r(X) ≥ fα(X) for some X ⊆ V and the sum-rate
r(V ) = α, then we necessarily put constraint
r(V \X) = r(V )− r(X) ≤ f#α (V \X)
on set V \ X . By converting the constraints in B(fα,≥) in
the same way for all X ⊆ V , we get the base polyhedron
B(f#α ,≤) = {rV ∈ R
|V |
+ : rV ∈ P (f
#
α ,≤), r(V ) = f
#
α (V )}
such that B(f#α ,≤) = B(fα,≥).
Example III.1. For the CO system in Example II.1, we have
CG = B(fα,≥) where
B(fα,≥) = {rV ∈ R
|V |
+ : r(∅) = 0, r({1}) ≥ 1,
r({2}) ≥ 0, r{3}) ≥ 0,
r({1, 2}) ≥ 3, r({1, 3}) ≥ 3
r({2, 3}) ≥ 1, r({1, 2, 3}) = α}.
By converting constraint r(X) ≥ fα(X) to r(V \ X) ≤
f#α (V \X) for all X ⊆ V , we have
B(f#α ,≤) = {rV ∈ R
|V |
+ : r(∅) = 0, r({1}) ≤ α− 1,
r({2}) ≤ α− 3, r({3}) ≤ α− 3,
r({1, 2}) ≤ α, r({1, 3}) ≤ α
r({2, 3}) ≤ α− 1, r({1, 2, 3}) = α}.
It can be shown that B(f#α ,≤) = B(fα,≥), ∀α ∈ R+.
3B. Interpretation of Core in CO
The core as expressed in (3) is in fact the set that contains
all achievable rate vectors having sum-rate equal to α in CO.
It can be interpreted as follows. Since CG = B(f#α ,≤), we
can write CG as
CG = {rV ∈ R
|V |
+ : r(X) ≤ fα(V )− fα(V \X), ∀X ⊆ V,
r(V ) = α}.
If fα(X) is the payoff for forming coalition X , then fα(V )−
fα(V \X) is the cost when coalitionX choose not to cooperate
in the grand coalition V [13]. A rate vector rV ∈ R|V |+ is a
rate allocation method that divides sum-rate r(V ) = α in V ,
where r(X), the sum-rate in coalition X , can be considered as
the cost for X to be cooperative in V . Then, r(X) ≤ fα(V )−
fα(V \X) means that the cost when X agrees to cooperate
in V is no greater than when X denies to do so. If the core is
nonempty, there exists at least one rate allocation method such
that all users would not prefer forming the coalitions smaller
than the grand one, or, alternatively speaking, there exists a
rate allocation method that motivates all users to participate in
information exchanging for CO. In this case, the game is called
stable [14] and the core can be considered as the solution set
for the game.
IV. NONEMPTINESS OF CORE
Since the core is not guaranteed to be nonempty in all
coalitional games, there is a fundamental question:
(a) When is the core nonempty?
If the core is nonempty, we need to answer the question:
(b) Can we find a rate vector rV in the core that allocates
the value of the grand coalition fα(V ) = α fairly among
the users?
The main purpose of this section is to answer question
(a). We study the submodularity of the base polyhedron of
the characteristic function to derive a necessary and sufficient
condition for the nonemptiness of the core. Question (b) will
be answered in Section V.
A. Necessary and Sufficient Condition
Recall that CG = B(fα,≥) = B(f#α ,≤), i.e., we can
study either B(fα,≥) or B(f#α ,≤) in order to determine the
nonemptiness of CG. In this section, we choose to consider
B(f#α ,≤) based on which we show that the condition for the
nonemptiness of the core can be straightforwardly derived.
Definition IV.1 (sub/supermodular). Function g : 2V 7→ R is
submodular if
g(X) + g(Y ) ≥ g(X ∪ Y ) + g(X ∩ Y ), ∀X,Y ⊆ V ; (4)
g is supermodular if −g is submodular.
Lemma IV.2. If α ≥ H(ZV ), f#α is submodular, that is
f#α (X) + f
#
α (Y ) ≥ f
#
α (X ∪ Y ) + f
#
α (X ∩ Y ) (5)
for all X,Y ⊆ V ; If α < H(ZV ), f#α is intersecting
submodular, that is inequality (5) holds for all X,Y ⊆ V
such that X ∩ Y 6= ∅.
Proof: For function f#α , we have
f#α (X) + f
#
α (Y )− f
#
α (X ∪ Y )− f
#
α (X ∩ Y ) =

H(X) +H(Y )
−H(X ∪ Y )−H(X ∩ Y ) + α−H(V ) X ∩ Y = ∅
H(X) +H(Y )−H(X ∪ Y )−H(X ∩ Y ) otherwise
.
Due to the submodularity of the entropy function H , i.e.,
H(X) +H(Y ) ≥ H(X ∪ Y ) +H(X ∩ Y ) ∀X,Y ⊆ V,
if α ≥ H(ZV ), inequality (5) holds ∀X,Y ⊆ V , i.e., f#α is
submodular; if α < H(ZV ), inequality (5) holds ∀X,Y ⊆
V : X ∩ Y 6= ∅, i.e., f#α is intersecting submodular.
Denote Π(V ) the partition set that contains all possible
partitions of V and Π′(V ) = Π(V ) \ {V }.
Theorem IV.3. The core of G(V, α, fα) is nonempty if and
only if
α = min
P∈Π(V )
∑
C∈P
f#α (C). (6)
Proof: Recall that CG = B(f#α ,≤). If α ≥ H(ZV ), f#α
is submodular and f#α (V ) = minP∈Π(V )
∑
C∈P f
#
α (C) = α.
Then, B(f#α ,≤) is a submodular base polyhedron which is not
empty [10]. If α < H(ZV ), f#α is intersecting submodular, and
(6) is the necessary and sufficient condition for B(f#α ,≤) to be
nonempty according to Lemma A.1 in Appendix A. Therefore,
theorem holds.
B. Minimum sum-rate in CO
Based on Theorem (IV.3), we can derive the minimum sum-
rate for CO as follows.
Corollary IV.4. The core of G(V, α, fα) is non-empty if α ≥
RCO(ZV ), where
RCO(ZV ) = max
P∈Π′(V )
∑
C∈P
H(ZV \C |ZC)
|P| − 1
(7)
for asymptotic model and
RCO(ZV ) =
⌈
max
P∈Π′(V )
∑
C∈P
H(ZV \C |ZC)
|P| − 1
⌉
(8)
for non-asymptotic model.
Proof: Since f#α (V ) = α, (6) in Theorem IV.3 is
equivalent to α ≤ minP∈Π′(V )
∑
C∈P f
#
α (C) which can be
written as
α ≥ max
P∈Π′(V )
∑
C∈P
H(ZV \C |ZC)
|P| − 1
. (9)
Then, the minimum sum-rate must be the minimum value of
α such that (9) holds. So, we have (7) for asymptotic model.
For non-asymptotic setting, α is the least integer number such
that (9) holds. So, we have (8). According to Theorem IV.3,
CG 6= ∅ if α ≥ RCO(ZV ).
Example IV.5. For the CO model in Example II.1, it can be
show that RCO(ZV ) = 3.5 and RCO(ZV ) = 4 for asymptotic
and non-asymptotic models, respectively, by applying (7) and
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Fig. 1. The the polyhedron P (f#3.2,≤) for the CO system in Example II.1
and the plane r(V ) = 3.2. In this case, the intersection CG = B(f#3.2,≤
) = ∅.
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Fig. 2. B(f#3.5,≤) = {(2.5, 0.5, 0.5)} for the CO system in Exam-
ple II.1. In this system, RCO(ZV ) = 3.5 for asymptotic model. Consider
game G(V, 3.2, f3.2). We have R∗CO(ZV ) = CG = B(f
#
3.5,≤) and
{(2.5, 0.5, 0.5)} is the only one optimal rate vector for CO.
(8). If we increase α from α = 0 and observe the base
polyhedron B(f#α ,≤), the intersection of P (f#α ,≤) and plane
r(V ) = α, it can be shown that P (f#α ,≤) does not intersect
with plane r(V ) = α, i.e., B(f#α ,≤) = ∅, until α = 3.5.
For example, B(f#3.2,≤) = ∅ in Fig. 1. At α = 3.5,
B(f#3.5,≤) = {(2.5, 0.5, 0.5)} in Fig. 2 and B(f#α ,≤) 6= ∅
for all α ≥ 3.5. But, B(f#α ,≤) ∩ Z3 = ∅ until α = 4 where
B(f#4 ,≤) ∩ Z
3 = {(3, 0, 1), (2, 1, 1), (3, 1, 0)} as shown in
Fig. 3.
If we replace H(ZV \C |ZC) with the cardinality function
|WV |−|WC | in (7) and (8), we get exactly the minimum sum-
rate expressions for asymptotic and non-asymptotic models,
respectively, for CCDE in [4]. Let I(ZV ) be the MMI measure
proposed in [7] that is defined as
I(ZV ) = min
P∈Π′(V )
D(PZV ‖
∏
C∈P PZC )
|P| − 1
.
D(·‖·) is the Kullback-Leibler divergence and
D(PZV ‖
∏
C∈P PZC ) =
∑
C∈P H(ZC) − H(ZV ). We
can write (7) and (8) as
RCO(ZV ) = H(ZV )− I(ZV ) (10)
and
RCO(ZV ) = H(ZV )− ⌊I(ZV )⌋,
0
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B(f#4 ,≤) ∩ Z
3
Shapley value
Fig. 3. B(f#4 ,≤) for the CO system in Example II.1. In this system,
RCO(ZV ) = 4 for non-asymptotic model. Consider game G(V, 4, f4).
We have R∗CO(ZV ) ∩ Z
3 = CG ∩ Z
3 = B(f#4 ,≤) ∩ Z
3 =
{(3, 0, 1), (2, 1, 1), (3, 1, 0)}. The Shapley value calculated in Example V.3
lies in the core.
which are exactly the minimum sum-rate for CO for asymp-
totic and non-asymptotic models, respectively, in [6], [15]. The
interpretation of (10) is as follows. I(ZV ) can be considered as
the maximum amount of information that is mutual to users
in V [7]. So, the minimum sum-rate for RCO(ZV ) must be
H(ZV )− I(ZV ), the mount of information that is not mutual
to users in V .
C. Convexity of Game
Convex game is a special class of coalitional game.
Definition IV.6 (Convex Game [16]). A coalitional game is
convex if the characteristic function is supermodular.
Convex game has nice properties [17]:
• The core is nonempty;
• Shapley value lies in the core.
In this section, we use the first property to interpret Corol-
lary IV.4. The second property will be used to present a fair
distribution of the value of the grand coalition fα(V ) = α that
lies in the core in Section V.
Lemma IV.7. For each α ≥ RCO(ZV ), there exists a convex
game Gˆ(V, α, fˆα) such that the cores of G and Gˆ are equal.
Proof: The Dilworth truncation of f#α is given by [18]
fˆ#α (X) = min
P∈Π(X)
∑
C∈P
f#α (C), ∀X ⊆ V. (11)
For α ≥ H(ZV ), fˆ#α = f#α since f#α is submodular; For
RCO(ZV ) ≤ α < H(ZV ), fˆ#α is submodular, fˆ#α (V ) =
f#α (V ) = α and B(fˆ#α ,≤) = B(f#α ,≤) [10]. Let
fˆα(X) = fˆ
#
α (V )− fˆ
#
α (V \X).
fˆα is supermodular and B(fˆα,≥) = B(f#α ,≤). Here,
B(fˆα,≥) is the core of game Gˆ(V, fˆα, α). Recall that CG =
B(f#α ,≤). Therefore, CG = CGˆ. In addition, if f#α is integer-
valued, so is fˆ#α [10]. Therefore, CG ∩ Z|V | = CGˆ ∩ Z|V | for
non-asymptotic model.
We use Lemma IV.7 to interpret Corollary IV.4 as follows. If
α ≥ RCO(ZV ), gameG(V, α, fα) is equivalent to convex game
5Gˆ(V, α, fˆα), where fˆα can be obtained from fα by Dilworth
truncation. In this case, CG = CGˆ 6= ∅ for asymptotic model
and CG ∩ Z|V | = CGˆ ∩ Z|V | 6= ∅ for non-asymptotic model
due to the convexity of Gˆ.
Since function fˆ#α is submodular, the optimization problem
on the core CG = B(fˆ#α ,≤) is closely related to SFM that
can be solved in strongly polynomial time. For example, the
problem of finding a rate vector rV ∈ CG = B(fˆ#α ,≤) can be
solved by Edmond’s greedy algorithm [9]. Related algorithms
can be found in [3], [8]. These algorithms always find an
extreme point (a vertex) of the core.
Example IV.8. Consider the CO system in Example II.1 when
α = 4 and its corresponding game model G(V, 4, f4). We
obtain fˆ#4 by the Dilworth truncation (11) and obtain fˆ4 as
fˆ4(∅) = 0, fˆ4({1}) = 2, fˆ4({2}) = 0, fˆ4({3}) = 0,
fˆ4({1, 2}) = 3, fˆ4({1, 3}) = 3, fˆ4({2, 3}) = 1,
fˆ4({1, 2, 3}) = 4. (12)
fˆ4 is supermodular and therefore Gˆ(V, 4, fˆ4) is a convex game.
It can be shown that CG = B(f4,≥) = B(fˆ4,≥) = CGˆ
and CG ∩ Z|V | = B(f4,≥) ∩ Z|V | = B(fˆ4,≥) ∩ Z|V | =
C
Gˆ
∩ Z|V |. In addition, B(fˆ4,≥) = B(fˆ#4 ,≤) = B(f
#
4 ,≤),
where B(f#4 ,≤) is shown in Fig. 3.
V. SHAPLEY VALUE
To make sure that all users are willing to cooperate, it is not
sufficient to just know that the core is nonempty. Since the core
is not a singleton in general, some solutions in the core may
not be a good choice in terms of fairness. For example, for the
CO system in Example II.1 when α = 4, the Edmond’s greedy
algorithm usually returns a vertex of the core CG = B(f#4 ,≤),
e.g., (3, 0, 1), which is one of the unfairest solutions in CG that
may make one or more users unwilling to cooperate. In CCDE,
to achieve some degree of fairness in rate allocation can also
prevent running out of mobile clients’ battery usage.
The authors in [19], [20] proposed polynomial time algo-
rithms to compute a fair rate vector in core CG for non-
asymptotic model in CCDE. The greedy algorithm in [19] is
based on SFM. The authors in [20] have shown that a fair
rate in the base polyhedron B(f#α ,≤), or the core CG, can be
found by solving an M -convex minimization for which there
exists a discrete steepest descent algorithm that can search the
optimal solution in polynomial time.
Finding a fair rate vector for the asymptotic model is more
complex than non-asymptotic one. Although the problem can
be easily formulated by a convex minimization problem, e.g.,
min{
∑
i∈V r
2
i : rV ∈ CG}, where the objective function is
defined based on Jain’s fairness index [21], the number of
constrains 2|V | is exponentially growing in |V |. In [11], the au-
thors build a multi-layer graph model and formulate a convex
minimization problem based on it. Although the constraints
is not as large as 2|V |, building new model and deriving
constraints based on this model incurs extra complexity. In
this section, we show an alternative way to achieve the fairness
based on game model G(V, α, fα): Shapley value.
Definition V.1 (Shapley Value [22]). For a coalitional game
with characteristic function g : 2V 7→ R, the Shapley Value is
a rate vector rˆV with each entry being
rˆi =
∑
X⊆V : i∈X
(|X | − 1)!|V \X |!
|V |!
(
g(X)− g(X \ {i})
)
.
The weight factor (|X|−1)!|V \X|!|V |! is the probability for user
i to enter coalition X in a random order [22]. Therefore,
rˆi can be considered as the expected marginal value of
the characteristic function g when the users join coalitions
randomly to form the grand coalition V [14].
Lemma V.2. For asymptotic model, if α ≥ RCO(ZV ), the
Shapley value rˆV with
rˆi =
∑
X⊆V \{i}
(|V \X | − 1)!|X |!
|V |!
(
fˆ#α (X ∪ {i})− fˆ
#
α (X)
)
lies in the core and is a fair method to distribute the value of
the grand coalition fα(V ) = α among all users.
Proof: Based on the proof of Lemma IV.7, if α ≥
RCO(ZV ), CG = CGˆ. Game Gˆ(V, α, fˆα) is convex and the
characteristic function fˆα is defined as fˆα(X) = fˆ#α (V ) −
fˆ#α (V \X), ∀X ⊆ V . The Shapley value of Gˆ is
rˆi =
∑
X⊆V : i∈X
(|X | − 1)!|V \X |!
|V |!
(
fˆα(X)− fˆα(X \ {i})
)
=
∑
X⊆V \{i}
(|V \X | − 1)!|X |!
|V |!
(
fˆ#α (X ∪ {i})− fˆ
#
α (X)
)
.
It is shown in [23] that rˆV ∈ CGˆ and is a fair method to
distribute α in set V .
Example V.3. Consider the CO system in Example II.1. We
obtain function fˆ#4 by Dilworth truncation (11) as
fˆ
#
4 (∅) = 0, fˆ
#
4 ({1}) = 3, fˆ
#
4 ({2}) = 1, fˆ
#
4 ({3}) = 1,
fˆ
#
4 ({1, 2}) = 4, fˆ
#
4 ({1, 3}) = 4, fˆ
#
4 ({2, 3}) = 2,
fˆ
#
4 ({1, 2, 3}) = 4.
Note, the values of fˆ#4 have been used to determine function fˆ4
in Example IV.8. For user 1, the possible values of X ⊆ V \{1}
are ∅, {2}, {3} and {2, 3}. Therefore,
rˆ1 =
2!0!
3!
(3− 0) +
1!1!
3!
(4 − 1)
+
1!1!
3!
(4 − 1) +
0!2!
3!
(4− 2) =
8
3
. (13)
In the same way, we find rˆ2 = 23 and rˆ3 = 23 . The Shapley
value rˆV = (83 ,
2
3 ,
2
3 ) is plotted in Fig. 3, where it can be
seen that rˆV ∈ CG and rˆV is a fair rate allocation method as
compared to other rate vectors in the core.
Although obtaining the Dilworth truncation fˆ#(X) for a
particular X is related to SFM and can be completed in
strongly polynomial time [24], the complexity of obtaining
Shapley value is exponentially growing with |V |. How to
reduce the complexity of calculating Shapley value is still an
open problem in the literature [22]. However, the advantage
6of Shapley value over the method in [11] is that it can be
learned in a decentralized manner: As long as user i obtains
the knowledge of the whole system, e.g., fα, his/her tuple rˆi
in Shapley value can be calculated by him/herself.
VI. CONCLUSION
We formulated the problem of CO by a coalition game
model where the core contained all achievable rate vectors that
satisfied the Slepian-Wolf constraints for CO and had sum-
rate equal to a given value. We showed that the core was a
base polyhedron of a submodular or intersecting submodular
function. We derived the necessary and sufficient condition
for the core to be nonempty, based on which we gave the
expression of the minimum sum-rate for CO and showed that
they were consistent with the existing results in the literature.
We proved that the game was convex when the sum-rate was
greater or equal to the minimum sum-rate and showed that a
fair rate vector in the core could be obtained by calculating the
Shapley value. However, since the complexity of obtaining the
Shapley value is exponentially growing, it is worth discussing
how to allow users to learn the fair rate vector in the core
in polynomial time, which could be one of the direction of
research work in the future.
APPENDIX A
Lemma A.1. For an intersecting submodular function
g : 2V 7→ R+ such that g(∅) = 0, the base polyhedronB(g,≤)
is nonempty if and only if
g(V ) = min
P∈Π(V )
∑
C∈P
g(C)
Proof: Theorem 2.6 in [10] gives the necessary and
sufficient conditions for B(g,≤) to be nonempty:
g(V ) = max
P∈Π(V )
∑
C∈P
g#(C) = min
P∈Π(V )
∑
C∈P
g(C), (14)
which is equivalent to g(V ) ≥
∑
C∈P g
#(C) and g(V ) ≤∑
C∈P g(C) for all P ∈ Π′(V ). The latter can be written as
g(V ) ≤
∑
C∈P
(g(V )− g#(V \ C))
⇒ g(V ) ≤ |P |g(V )−
∑
C∈P
g#(V \ C)
⇒ g(V ) ≥
∑
C∈P g
#(V \ C)
|P | − 1
, ∀P ∈ Π′(V ).
Due to the intersecting submodularity of g, for all ∅ 6= X,Y ⊂
V such that X ∩ Y = ∅ and X ∪ Y 6= V , we have
g#(X ∪ Y ) ≥ g#(X) + g#(Y ).
So, for all C ∈ P where P is some partition in Π′(V ), g#(V \
C) ≥
∑
C′∈P\C g
#(C′) and
∑
C∈P g
#(V \ C) ≥ (|P | −
1)
∑
C∈P g
#(C), i.e.,
∑
C∈P
g#(V \ C)
|P | − 1
≥
∑
C∈P
g#(C), ∀P ∈ Π′(V ).
Therefore, (14) reduces to g(V ) ≤∑C∈P g(C), ∀P ∈ Π′(V ),
which is equivalent to g(V ) = minP∈Π(V )
∑
C∈P g(C).
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